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Abstract
Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of
greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets; this selection
could impact the viability of these markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease
(HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with signicant eects on morbidity, to estimate adverse
selection in long-term care insurance. We nd strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who
carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term
care insurance. We use these estimates to make predictions about the future of this market as genetic
information increases. We argue that even relatively limited increases in genetic information may
threaten the viability of private long-term care insurance.
1 Introduction
Personalized genetic information is increasingly available. Genes associated with increased risk of breast
cancer, colon cancer, Parkinson disease and Alzheimer disease, among others, have been identied and
testing for these genes is becoming much more common. Continued advances in technology and
knowledge of the human genome are likely to bring even more sophisticated and precise testing, for these
and other conditions.1 This testing, in turn, is likely to increase the degree of private information that
individuals have about their mortality and morbidity risks.2 In this paper we explore the possible impact
of this increased information on the markets for long-term care insurance.
We are grateful to Amy Finkelstein, Larry Katz, Lee Lockwood, Kathleen McGarry, Jesse Shapiro, Heidi Williams and
participants in a seminar at the University of Chicago for helpful comments.
1For example, there has been signicant recent work on genome wide association studies, which look at entire individual
genomes to identify markers that are common in individuals with a given condition (e.g. Burton et al, 2007).
2Interestingly, it seems possible that much of this testing could take place outside of traditional clinical environments { for
example, through companies like \23 and Me".
1There is a large literature in economics which estimates adverse selection in insurance markets.3
Increasingly, the ndings in this literature point to the importance of multiple dimensions of preference
heterogeneity (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cohen and Einav, 2007;
Cutler et al, 2008; Fang, Keene and Silverman, 2008; Einav et al, 2009). Although private information
about risk type can and does drive insurance purchases, this may be outweighed (or reinforced) by other
dimensions of heterogeneity. For example, private risk information about mortality may be counteracted
by the fact that people with a lower preference for risk also own more life insurance, and these people are,
on average, less likely to die early (McCarthy and Mitchell, 2003). However, this heterogeneity may also
work in the opposite direction { to reinforce adverse selection { for a product like annuities (Einav et al,
2009).
For long-term care insurance, which we consider in this paper, it appears that at the moment
preference heterogeneity serves to oset adverse selection due to private information; studies typically
nd little or no correlation between ownership and risk realization (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006;
Cutler et al, 2008). However, while there is limited reason to expect changes in preference heterogeneity
over time, increased availability of genetic testing has the potential to dramatically increase private
information in this market. In principle, this information could signicantly change the overall
correlation between ownership and payouts and have large eects on the viability of this market in the
long-term. This issue may well be of policy importance, especially as legislation is increasingly enacted to
restrict the ability of insurers to observe individual genetic risk information (e.g. United States House of
Representatives, 2007).
Evaluating whether we will see increased adverse selection as genetic information increases requires a
setting in which (a) individuals have a large amount of private information, which the researcher can
observe and (b) that this is information individuals would like to act on. This paper takes advantage of a
setting in which both requirements are satised, using a dataset on individuals at risk for Huntington
disease (HD). We use data on individuals at risk for HD alongside individuals without HD risk to
estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We then use our estimates to evaluate the longer
term consequences of increased genetic information on the functioning of that market.
HD is a degenerative neurological disorder caused by an inherited genetic mutation on chromosome 4
that aects roughly 1 in 10,000 individuals in Caucasian populations. Because of the inherited, genetic
nature of the disease individuals have signicant private information about their disease risk. Those with
3See, for example, Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cawley and Philipson, 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; McCarthy
and Mitchell, 2003; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Cutler et al, 2008; Smart, 2000; De Meza and Webb, 2001.
2one parent with the disease know they have a 50% chance of developing it, and those who have taken a
genetic test and carry the aected gene know they will develop the disease, assuming they do not die
earlier from something else. A perfectly predictive genetic test for HD has been available since 1993.
Further, the information is extremely relevant. Individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation begin to
deteriorate neurologically (mentally and physically), typically between the ages of 30 and 50, and death
follows an average of 20 years after onset. Individuals become increasingly disabled over this period
(Walker, 2007). There is no cure for HD, and only limited treatment options. The long, likely expensive,
disability period suggests that long-term care insurance would have signicant value.
We begin by outlining a simple theory of adverse selection in long-term care insurance, which clearly
predicts adverse selection in our setting.4 We focus on long-term care insurance in this paper, despite the
fact that it is a relatively small market, for a number of reasons. First, we argue that it is a particularly
clear case for exploring adverse selection, since the primary dierence between individuals with and
without the genetic mutation is the probability of needing long-term care. This is in contrast to
something like life insurance, where individuals with the genetic mutation are more likely to die early but
also experience very dierent income streams during their lifetime as a result of the disease. Second,
most long-term care insurance is purchased through individual policies, enhancing the possibility for
adverse selection heavily aecting the aggregate functioning of the market. Finally, although the
long-term care insurance market is small relative to, for example, health insurance, it is still large in
absolute terms { 1.2% of GDP in 2004 { and in the absence of private insurance coverage most
expenditures are covered by the government, through Medicaid (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009).
We test for the presence of adverse selection in long-term care insurance using data from a
prospective cohort study (PHAROS) of approximately 1000 individuals at risk for HD. At enrollment
into this sample, individuals had one parent who had HD, had not undergone genetic testing and were
asymptomatic, so their chance of carrying the genetic mutation is approximately 50%.5 Participants have
been re-surveyed approximately every 9 months from the time of enrollment (1999 or 2000) to the
present, and over this period approximately 10% have pursued testing for the genetic mutation.
We perform several tests using these data. First, we compare insurance ownership among the
population at risk for HD to individuals in the general population, drawn from the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS). Second, for a subset of the tested individuals we are able to partially observe their genetic
4We follow a very large theoretical literature on genetic adverse selection (e.g. Hoy and Polborn, 2002; Hoy and Witt, 2007;
Viswanathan et al, 2007; Pauly et al, 2003; MacMinn and Brockett, 2004; Strohmenger and Wambach, 2000; Subramanian et
al, 1999; Hoy, Orsi, Eisinger and Moatti, 2003; Doherty and Thistle, 1996; Hoel and Iverson, 2002).
5The fact that we observe only individuals who have not been tested at enrollment introduces possible selection issues,
which are discussed in more detail in the context of the results.
3status6 and therefore compare individuals at 50% risk to those who know they have the genetic mutation
(100% risk) and those that know they do not have the mutation (0% risk). Finally, we can compare
individuals who have been tested and know they carry the genetic mutation to those who have been
tested and know they do not. This last analysis is our cleanest test { it is not subject to concerns about
selection into testing, for example. However, we are somewhat cautious about this analysis, due to
relatively small sample sizes and our need to infer gene test results rather than observing them directly.
Using these data, we nd signicant evidence of adverse selection. In the general population (the
HRS), 10% of individuals own long-term care insurance. In the PHAROS population, 25% of individuals
own long-term care insurance. Among those who pursued genetic testing and know they carry the
mutation responsible for HD, ownership is close to 50%.7 The rate of long-term care insurance ownership
among those individulas who know they are at 100% risk for developing HD is 30 percentage points
higher than those who also pursued genetic test and know they do not carry the genetic mutation for
HD.8 This primary result of the paper can be seen simply in Figure 1. When we look at the timing of
ownership around testing, we nd limited evidence of increased insurance among tested individuals before
testing, but a large increase in ownership among carrier individuals after testing, again consistent with
HD risk driving adverse selection.
An important issue in interpreting these results is whether individuals in the HD population are
comparable to those in the HRS, other than their HD risk. The primary concern is that individuals in
the HRS are, on average, much older than individuals in the HD population. We attempt to address this,
and other demographic dierences, by including extensive controls for demographics (e.g. xed eects for
age, income, education, gender). In general, we nd that the eects of HD are not driven by
demographics and the magnitude of the HD eect swamps the eect of the demographic dierences. In
addition, comparing individuals within the HD at-risk population provides an extremely well identied
test: these individuals are, in expectation, identical ex ante { nature \randomizes" which of them receive
the aected copy of the gene. Finally, because long-term care insurance ownership tends to be higher
among older individuals, the older population in the HRS suggest that, if anything, our results are an
underestimate of adverse selection in long-term care. As a robustness check, in an appendix we show
6In fact, we infer individual test results based on subsequent disease development, or subsequent responses to questions
about their self-perception of carrying the genetic mutation ; this is described in more detail in the data section.
7Throughout the paper we will sometimes refer to individuals who are tested and know they carry the genetic mutation as
having a \positive" test result.
8Although we can reject equality between individuals who do not carry the genetic mutation and those who have been
tested and do not carry the genetic mutation, the latter group do not own signicantly less insurance than non-tested, HD-risk
individuals. This could be due to stickiness in the ownership of insurance or, more likely, may be driven by an imperfect
feature of our data { that we have to infer test results { which we hope will be remedied in later versions of this paper.
4estimates of adverse selection based on an alternative dataset (the Consumer Expenditure Survey), which
we argue is less well suited for many reasons, but does have a population with a closer age match. If
anything, the results are stronger with this comparison group.
Armed with these estimates, we then turn to the second aim of the paper: evaluating possible future
consequences for the long-term care insurance market. We consider whether the viability of the markets
is likely to be threatened by increases in availability of genetic information. Our estimates of adverse
selection, plus information on insurance premiums and the chance of needing long-term care, can be used
to generate a demand curve for long-term care insurance. Private information shifts this demand curve.
We consider the case where a monopolist insurer faces a market with some share of a low type, who have
no private information, and some share of a high type, who have private information that they are high
risk. We solve for optimal pricing, under a pooling equilibrium, for environments where the share of high
type individuals dier.9 We nd that when the share of the high type is small (as is certainly the case
with HD), a monopoly insurer can make positive prots selling to both types, since low types are willing
to purchase some insurance at actuarially unfair prices. As the share of the high type increases, the
market eventually shifts, abruptly, to selling only to the high type. Our calculations suggest that this
occurs when the share of the high type is small, around 3%.
This analysis can also be used to calculate consumer surplus under private versus public information.
Those calculations suggest that when the insurer is willing to sell to both types, consumer surplus is
strictly higher when information is private. However, once the insurer is no longer willing to sell to both
types, it would be Pareto-improving to make genetic information available to the insurer: low types
would be better o, since they would be able to purchase insurance, and high types would be no worse
o, since they are already paying the full, high-type insurance premiums. This suggests that legislation
prohibiting insurers from observing genetic information may be a mixed blessing; in the short run, this
will increase consumer surplus, but in the long run it may reduce it. Given the dierence in the short-run
and long-run implications, it seems important to understand the current state of genetic knowledge. A
simple summary of available genetic testing suggests that { even if everyone eligible for genetic testing for
relevant diseases got it { the share of the \high type" would only be around 0.1%. This indicates that,
certainly in the current state and likely for the immediate future, consumer surplus will be higher with
private information than without.
In the context of the existing literature on private information and adverse selection, this paper
9There is no separating equilibrium in this case, since the high type gets the payout for sure, so the insurer will never be
willing to oer them a contract with any \insurance", and they would prefer any contract oered to the low type.
5suggests that adverse selection in this market may become much more important over time, as the
amount of private genetic information increases. In the current state of the world, with relatively limited
private information, variations in preferences seem to outweigh these eects, but this may well not be
true even in the relatively near future.
In addition to this contribution, we add to a small existing literature on insurance purchases and
genetic risk, which so far has had somewhat mixed results with small sample sizes (Armstrong et al,
2003; Aktan-Collan et al, 2001; Zick et al, 2000; Zick et al, 2005; Taylor et al, 2009). In the most closely
related of these papers, Zick et al (2005) show increases in long-term care purchases as a result of an
intervention informing individuals about an increased risk for Alzheimer disease. The analysis here
provides sharper evidence on this question, because HD has a clearer genetic risk, our sample is much
larger and the population contains individuals at widely dierent levels of risk. These advantages allow
us to make a systematic attempt to calibrate the impact of this information on the viability of insurance
markets which has not previously been done and seems the most policy-relevant issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives background on Huntington disease and
on the insurance markets considered here, as well as describing the data. Section 3 presents a very simple
theory. Section 4 shows the results, Section 5 analyzes the long-term care market viability, and Section 6
concludes with policy implications.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Background on Huntington Disease
In this section we provide only a brief overview of Huntington disease; for a fuller clinical discission,
please see Walker (2007).
Huntington disease (HD) is a degenerative neurological disorder aecting an estimated 30,000
individuals in the United States. Individuals with the disease typically begin to manifest symptoms in
middle age (30-50) although age of onset varies from early childhood to as late as 80. The symptoms of
HD include a movement disorder, impaired cognition, and psychiatric disturbances. The movement
disorder consists of random, uncontrollable dance-like movements of the face, trunk, and extremities. The
cognitive dysfunction includes memory loss and impaired higher order thinking, which aects an
individual's ability to work. The psychiatric disturbances are wide ranging and include depression,
changes in personality, anxiety, and psychosis. The disease is progressive. Individuals will need increasing
levels of supportive and often institutional care for many years. Death follows approximately 20 years
6after onset. Although it is dicult to be precise about the length of time individuals need long-term care,
estimates suggest that on average they will need some type of care for at least ten years, and 70-80% end
up in a nursing home at some point, for an average of around 6 years (Bolt, 1970; Nance and Saunders,
1996; Walker et al, 1981; Harper, 1996).
HD is a genetic disorder due to an inappropriate expansion in the huntingtin gene on chromosome 4.
The disease is inherited in an autosomal dominant manner, such that individuals who have a parent with
HD will have a 50% chance of inheriting the genetic mutation and subsequently developing the disease.
Development of the disease without an aected parent is extremely rare. There is no cure for HD or
treatment that slows the progression. In 2008, tetrabenazine was approved to treat the HD movement
symptoms, but it does not treat the cognitive or psychiatric symptoms, delay disease onset, or slow
disease progression.
Since 1993, a test for the HD genetic mutation has been available. However, testing rates are fairly
low: 5-10% of the at-risk population reports predictive testing (Meyers, 2004). Testing for HD is a
signicant decision for at-risk individuals and typically involves a period of pre-testing counseling. The
lack of any treatment or cure, and the fear of being unable to live with a positive result are signicant
barriers (Oster et al, 2008).
2.2 Background on long-term Care Insurance
Long-term care insurance is designed to cover expenditures for either home care or nursing home care for
the elderly. This insurance is typically purchased through individual or small-group policies. Brown and
Finkelstein (2009) provide an excellent summary of the current literature within economics on long-term
care insurance markets. Long-term care insurance ownership is fairly limited in the general population,
with ownership rates around 10% for individuals in the 60-85 age range.
Brown and Finkelstein (2007) describe characteristics of a typical long-term care insurance contract:
an \elimination" period (analogous to a deductible), a maximum benet period of 1-5 years, and a
maximum daily benet (which is typically below what a day in a nursing home costs, although probably
above the cost of a day of home care). There is signicant overlap between services oered by Medicaid
and long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). However, in the overall population, one
third of long-term care expenses are paid out of pocket, suggesting that neither Medicaid nor insurance is
providing comprehensive coverage (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009).
From the perspective of our analysis, there are at least two features of this market which are
important to understand: how attractive long-term care insurance is to someone with HD risk, and how
7we expect insurance pricing and availability to vary with HD risk. To address this rst question, we can
compare insurance loads for someone with and without a risk for HD (insurance load in this case is
dened as one minus the expected payout for each dollar paid in). We use the methodology from Brown
and Finkelstein (2007), along with information about HD disease progression, to calculate these loads.
Brown and Finkelstein (2007) argue that the load is around -$0.18 for an individual in the general
population, meaning the policy returns an average of 82 cents for each dollar paid in. In contrast, for
someone at age 40 with a 50% HD risk we calculate a load of about $1.40: they expect to get $2.40 back
for each dollar paid in premiums. For someone who knows they have the genetic mutation, the load is
$2.96, implying a payout of almost $4 for each $1 paid in. For either type of individual, this is a very
good nancial investment.10
To address the second question, we have accessed and reviewed a number of long-term care insurance
applications. The rst thing to note is that, prior to asking anything detailed about medical history,
these applications typically ask whether an individual \Currently has or has ever been diagnosed with"
any of a list of conditions, which includes HD. Individuals who answer \yes" to anything on this list are
advised that it is unlikely they will be insurable. Other than this initial screening, however, individuals
are never asked specically about their HD risk (or any genetic risk), nor are they asked about a family
history or parental cause of death. The applications typically ask for medical records from any primary
care physician that the individual has seen in the past eighteen months. This could, in principle, reveal
HD risk, but even this is avoidable, by either never discussing HD risk with one's primary care doctor or
by getting a new doctor more than eighteen months before applying.
Subsequent to this written application, individuals typically meet with an insurance broker, and may
be asked to undergo a physical screening by a doctor. Insurers we talked to suggested this would rarely
be required for someone under 65, although a phone call to the client would be typical, as would a drug
screen. Doctor's records are sometimes ordered although, again, frequently not for younger individuals.
Overall, this process suggests that currently healthy individuals { regardless of their HD risk { are likely
to face the same long-term care insurance pricing. However, there may be a dierent story for someone
experiencing symptoms { the symptoms of HD are quite noticeable, and it seems likely that a broker
could pick up on this even in a casual screening or a phone call, at which point coverage would likely be
10To do these calcuations we use the basic framework provided by Brown and Finkelstein (2007) and used in their paper.
We use the same assumptions that they use on interest rate progression, cost of nursing and payouts by insurers. The only
change we make is in the transition matrices. For individuals at risk for HD we assume (a) more likely transition into needing
home care and nursing care, (b) faster death once in those states, (c) no possibility of assisted living (this is quite unusual for
individuals with HD, who are typically either at home or in a nursing home) and (d) no transition out of those state. We use
information from a number of sources to calculate the HD transition matrices (Bolt, 1970; Nance and Saunders, 1996; Walker
et al, 1981; Harper, 1996); the matrices we use are available from the authors.
8denied. This suggests that delaying purchase until after onset of symptoms may not be optimal, or even
possible. It is important to note that, given the structure of insurance applications, purchases by at risk
individuals should not be viewed as \fraud", since individuals are not asked about genetic risks.
2.3 Data
This paper makes use of two datasets. The rst, data on individuals at risk for HD, comes from the
PHAROS study; data on individuals in the general population is drawn from the Health and Retirement
Survey.
PHAROS Data
The PHAROS (Prospective Huntington At Risk Observational Study) study is a prospective,
observational study of individuals at risk for HD conducted by the Huntington Study Group (Huntington
Study Group PHAROS Investigators, 2006). The study began in 1999 and includes 1001 individuals at
roughly 40 study sites in the United States and Canada. Individuals in the PHAROS study were
interviewed at recruitment, and then approximately every nine months afterwards. The PHAROS study
is scheduled to conclude in 2010. To be enrolled in PHAROS, individuals had to be at risk for HD: that
is, they had one parent (or rst-degree relative, like a sibling) with HD, but were not tested prior to
enrollment. Participants in PHAROS are not a random sample of individuals at risk of HD. First, they
needed to be willing to participate in the study, which may imply other dierences. There is little we can
do to address this. Second, enrolled individuals must not have been tested at the time of enrollment. We
will discuss this second type of selection in more detail with the results. Third, participants had to be
asymptomatic (not show symptoms of HD) at the time of study enrollment. The combination of the
latter two points means that the chance of carrying the genetic mutation, among PHAROS participants
overall, is slightly less than 50% (it is more like 40%). This will be important in the calibration of
demand curves in Section 6.
Participant visits during PHAROS contained two primary sections. First, individuals responded to a
set of questionnaires, some of which were given only once during the study period, and some of which
were given at more than one visit, or at every visit. These questionnaires included psychological tests,
questions about changes in life circumstances (marriage, children, etc) and basic demographics.
Individuals were also asked about their disease experience { whether they had undergone genetic testing
for HD, when they were tested, whether they had noticed any disease symptoms, what they thought their
probability of having the HD genetic mutation was, etc. Second, visits included a doctor exam, at which
9doctors completed a series of motor tests with the individual to screen for signs of HD. At the end of this
exam the doctors scored individuals on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 indicated no motor abnormalities and
4 indicated \motor abnormalities that are unequivocal signs of HD ( 99% condence)."
Two questionnaires were administered which covered insurance ownership. The rst, which was
administered (for most participants) one or two times during the course of the study asked (a) whether
the individual had any long-term care or life insurance and (b) if yes, how long they have owned each
type. The second questionnaire was intended to be administered at all visits and simply asked whether
the individual had made any changes in their insurance since their last visit. Using the information from
these two questionnaires together, we coded insurance ownership for as many periods as possible for each
individual. In some cases this involved inference (for example, if an individual reports having insurance
and then in the next visit indicates they have not changed their ownership, we coded them as continuing
to have insurance). Details about this inference are in Appendix A. We observe only the extensive
margin of long-term care insurance ownership, although this may not result in much loss of data, since
the range of long-term care insurance contracts is fairly limited (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007).
Our primary analysis involves comparing individuals in the PHAROS sample, who anticipated about
a 50% chance of developing HD at enrollment, with individuals in a random sample of the population,
who have approximately a 0% chance (the true chance, based on population prevalence, is 0.01%). In
addition, we make use of variation within the HD population, using the sub-sample of individuals who
pursued genetic testing outside of the study. Roughly 10% of participants did so and therefore must
know their genetic status. All individuals in the study underwent genetic testing as part of the PHAROS
study. However, these results were not communicated to either the research participant or to the
physician investigator. Because the study has yet to conclude, these results are not yet available for
analysis; they are likely to become available eventually. However, for a large share of individuals who
have been tested outside the study we can infer their test result either by using information from the
doctor visit, or by the information they provide on their self-reported probability of carrying the genetic
mutation. Details of this inference are in Appendix B; of the 91 individuals tested during the sample
period, we can infer genetic status for 67 of them.11 It is important to note that the decision to get tested
may be reective of individual unobservables { for example, individuals who are risk averse may be more
likely to get tested and more likely to own long term care insurance { in which case the better
comparison is between tested individuals, across test results.
11Our inference is much better and more reliable for individuals who carry the genetic mutation for HD than those that do
not. We are therefore more condent about our results for those who carry the genetic mutation.
10There is also a distinction in our sample between individuals who are currently \asymptomatic" (no
symptoms) and those who are \symptomatic" (showing symptoms). To distinguish between these groups,
we use the doctor's exam score. Individuals who receive a 4 on this scale show signs of HD consistent
with a greater than 99% chance of having the disease. We classify these individuals as symptomatic, as
they are typically already showing signs of manifest HD. The symptomatic group is likely to face limited
ability to purchase new long-term care insurance, and may well be actually using their long-term care
insurance. For this reason, we exclude them from our analysis, although including them does not change
our central conclusions.
Summary statistics on basic demographics appear in Panel A of Table 1. The PHAROS sample is
predominantly female, and the majority are married with children. They are fairly highly educated,
typically with some college, and mostly employed. The average age in this population is 40. The data
from PHAROS is at the individual-year level. Standard errors will therefore be clustered by individual.
Health and Retirement Survey Data
We compare individuals in the PHAROS data to individuals in the general population, drawn from the
2000 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The HRS surveys roughly 20,000 individuals over
50 every two years. In recent years the data has included some individuals under 50 as part of specic
sub-studies or because they are spouses of sampled individuals; these younger people will not necessarily
be representative of the general population, since they are more likely to be married to older individuals.
The primary advantage of the HRS is that it asks about long-term care insurance ownership.
The primary disadvantage is that the individuals in the HRS are, on average, much older than the
individuals in PHAROS. The average age in the PHAROS sample is around 45; in the HRS overall, it is
67. This is clearly problematic, particularly given the product we are considering. Evidence from the
HRS data itself indicates that ownership of long-term care insurance increases as people age. It would be
preferable to have a more closely age-matched dataset; unfortunately, there exists only very limited data
on long-term care insurance ownership.
We address this mismatch in several ways. First, we limit the HRS data to individuals 65 and under.
This represents the upper end of the age range in the PHAROS data. With this limitation there is
complete overlap in the age distribution in the two datasets. However, the HRS is still much more heavily
weighted to older people. This can be seen in Panel B of Table 1, which displays summary statistics for
this younger subset of the HRS. Relative to the PHAROS individuals, those in the HRS are slightly less
likely to be female, have more children and less education; they are also, on average, 58.
11As a second step, all regressions include demographic controls { most importantly, xed eects for
age. The inclusion of age xed eects means that any age cohorts which are represented only in the HRS
and not in the PHAROS data will not drive the results. We will show our results excluding and including
these age xed eects. Since ownership of long-term care insurance increases over time in the general
population, the results without age xed eects should be a lower bound; the change in coecients with
inclusion of the xed eects give us a sense of how important these dierences across age groups are. We
also include controls for employment.
In addition, in Appendix C we run our primary analyses using the Consumer Expenditure Survey
which has information on expenditures on long-term care insurance. Although we argue in that Appendix
that this dataset is, overall, a less ideal comparison than the HRS (due primarily to the fact that data is
collected at the household level only), it nevertheless provides a useful check. The results look very
similar. If anything, the use of the Consumer Expenditure Survey suggests the HRS comparison
understates the degree of adverse selection.
There are two important nal notes. First, in contrast to the PHAROS data, there is only one
observation per individual in the HRS. Second, we may wonder whether any of the individuals in the HRS
are at risk for HD, which would mute the comparison. As noted, the rate of HD in the US is 1 in 10,000;
in the sample of 7,000 HRS individuals we would therefore predict fewer than one individual with HD.
3 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
In this section we briey outline a very simple theoretical framework, and then describe our estimation
strategy.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
We assume there are two states that an individual may experience: healthy (\good") or disabled (\bad").
A healthy individual becomes disabled in the next period with probability q. Income diers across states
of the world. In the healthy state, consumption is equal to Y1. In the disabled state consumption,
denoted Y2, is lower due to limited ability to work and high health expenses. Utility over consumption is
an increasing and concave function, u(:). We assume the only dierence between individuals with HD
risk and without is q: individuals who carry the genetic mutation for HD are more likely to become
disabled (i.e. have a higher q). Long-term care insurance is purchased for a price  per unit in the
healthy state and pays benets when disabled; denote units of long-term care insurance as T. We assume
12that  is unrelated to genetic risk; this is consistent with the discussion in Section 2.2.
We analyze the decision to purchase insurance on a period-by-period basis. We assume that if an
individual remains healthy in the next period, they get a chance to change their insurance choices, and
these choices are unaected by the current period choices; we denote the continuation utility V . Given
these parameters, individuals will choose the value of T to maximize Equation (1) below.
EU = u(Y1   T) + qu(Y2 + T) + (1   q)V (1)
Adverse selection occurs when individuals who look the same to the insurer, and therefore face the
same , purchase more insurance if they have a higher chance of experiencing the bad state. We expect
adverse selection if dT






2u00(Y1   T) + qu00(Y2 + T)
> 0 (2)
It is very important to note that this result relies crucially on the assumption that the only
dierence between those with and without the genetic risk is the probability of experiencing the bad state
(being disabled). The actual experience in the good and bad states { income, health expenditures { are
the same for the two groups. Put dierently, learning that you have the genetic mutation for HD changes
your expectation of the probability that you will be disabled, which changes the eective price of
insurance. However, it does not change the marginal utility of income in the two states, so has no eect
on the \insurance" motivation for purchasing insurance.
In the case of long-term care, this seems reasonable. The income before the period of disability is
likely to be similar for otherwise comparable individuals with and without the genetic mutation, as are
the nursing expenditures. The primary dierence between individuals with and without the genetic
mutation is the price of insurance: for those with the gene, insurance is a much better nancial
investment. However, this may be less true for other types of insurance. For example, in the case of life
insurance, learning that you have the genetic mutation for HD has a signicant impact on your \good"
state (alive) consumption, given the expectation of a shorter working life and expensive disability. This
means that learning about one's HD risk changes both the price of insurance (since death is more likely)
and the relative marginal utility of income in the good and bad states, which may work in opposite
directions in driving ownership.12 The fact that the prediction of advese selection is so clear in the
long-term care case is one of the major advantages of analyzing these issues in this market.
12There are other complications with analyzing life insurance, including the fact that much of it is owned through employers,
and becoming disabled often leads to loss of employment. We hope that we will be able to analyze life insurance choices in
future work.
133.2 Empirical Strategy
Our primary empirical strategy amounts to a comparison of insurance ownership among individuals in
the PHAROS population to those in the HRS. Dene the variable HDrisk equal to 1 if the individual is
in the PHAROS population and equal to 0 if they are in the HRS. Dened Owni as equal to one of the
individual owns insurance, and zero otherwise. Our primary regression equation is below
Owni =  + (HDrisk)i + Xi + i (3)
where Xi is a vector of controls. We interpret the coecient  as the extent of adverse selection.
In addition to this analysis, we will run several analyses in which the coecients are identied o of
variation within the PHAROS sample. Dene testpos as equal to one if an individual in PHAROS has
been tested, and their test result was positive, and zero otherwise. Dene testneg in parallel, but with a
negative test results. Finally, dene testuncl as equal to one if the individual was tested, but the result
cannot be inferred (note that the individual will know their test results; they are unclear, at this point, to
the researchers { see Appendix A). We estimate the regression below.
Owni =  + 1(HDrisk)i + 2(testpos)i + 3(testneg)i + 4(testuncl)i + Xi + i (4)
Our theory suggests that 2 > 0 and 3 < 0. Note that 2 and 3 in this regression are identied o of
variation in risk within the HD-risk population. This is helpful in addressing concerns that the results are
driven by omitted variable bias. We continue to include data from the general population, however, since
this allows us to adjust more precisely for expected variation in ownership by demographics.
In addition, we analyze how behavior is aected by proximity to testing. We dene ve testing
variables: a variable equal to one if the individual reports testing for the rst time two visits in the
future, a variable equal to one if the individual reports testing for the rst time one visit in the future, a
variable equal to one if the individual is rst tested in the current period, a variable equal to one if the
individual reported having been tested last period and is positive and a variable equal to one if the
individual reported having been tested last period and is negative. Note that these last two variable are
equal to one for all individuals who were tested last period, two periods ago, etc. These variables are all
equal to zero for individuals in the HRS. Denote these variables, respectively, as tested2, tested1, tested0,
testedpos and testedneg. We estimate:
Owni =  + 1(HDrisk)i + 2(tested2)i + 3(tested1)i
+4(tested0)i + 5(testedpos)i + 6(testedneg)i + Xi + i (5)
14We can interpret 1 as the adverse selection among un-tested individuals. 2 has a straightforward
interpretation: this is the increase (or decrease) in insurance ownership, relative to someone who is never
tested, among individuals who will be tested for the rst time two periods in the future. 3 and 4 have
similar interpretations, but for those who are tested for the rst time next period, or for the rst time in
the current period. 5 and 6 are the relative ownership for individuals who have been tested at least one
period in the past, dierentiated by test result.
4 Results: Adverse Selection in long-term Care Insurance
We begin by showing, in Table 2, basic comparisons of long-term care insurance ownership across groups
with dierent risk levels. In this table, and throughout the paper, we limit the data to asymptomatic
individuals, as discussed in Section 2 (these results can also be seen graphically, without statistical tests,
in Figure 1). The rst two rows show average ownership among the not-at-risk population in the HRS.
The rst row shows the simple mean level of ownership; the second row addresses the concern that the
HRS and the PHAROS data are not well-matched in terms of age by showing ownership among HRS
individuals weighted to replicate the PHAROS population.13 Comparing either of these rows to the third
row, which shows ownership among untested (roughly 50% risk) individuals in PHAROS, gives us our
rst result: insurance ownership is signicantly higher among at-risk individuals. Depending on the
comparison group used, individuals in PHAROS are 15 to 17 percentage points, or about two and a half
times, more likely to own long-term care insurance. This dierence is strongly signicant, as can be seen
from the p-values at the bottom of the panel
The fourth and fth rows show ownership among other risk categories within PHAROS: those who
have been tested and know they carry the genetic mutation (100% risk) and those that have been tested
and do not carry the mutation (0% risk). Both of these samples { particularly the negative test group {
are small, but the patterns are again consistent with the theoretical framework. Individuals who know
they carry the genetic mutation are roughly twice as likely to own long-term care insurance as at-risk
individuals, and this dierence is signicant. Those who were at risk but found out they do not carry the
genetic mutation are slightly less likely, although this dierence is smaller, and not signicant. Perhaps
most important, the dierence between individuals who tested positive and those who tested negative is
large and statistically signicant. These results are all consistent with our expectation of adverse
13To do this weighting, we divide the sample into four age categories { 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64 and calculate insurance
ownership among each group in the HRS. We then calculate the share of individuals in each group in PHAROS, and weight
the average ownership by group in the HRS using the age distribution from PHAROS.
15selection in this market.
Table 3 shows our primary estimates of adverse selection, adjusting for demographics. Columns 1-2
of this table focus on individuals at risk for HD versus the general population; Columns 3 and 4 estimate
the eect of variation in risk level within the HD population. Column 1 estimates the eect of HD risk on
insurance ownership adjusting for some demographics (income, education, employment, children and
marital status) but not including controls for age. As we noted in the data section, since the HRS sample
is older, and long-term care insurance is more common among older people, this should be a lower bound
on the estimate of adverse selection. The eect is slightly above 13 percentage points, similar to what we
saw in Table 2. In Column 2 we add in xed eects for age: consistent with our intuition about the eect
of this control, adding it in increases the coecient on HD risk. It should be noted, though, that this
increase is small: dierences in ownership across age groups in the HRS are not enormous, so this
adjustment is relatively minor. In both columns the eect is highly signicant.
We can get a visual sense of the magnitude of this adverse selection in Figure 2. To generate this
gure we run the regressions in Column 2 of Table 3 and predict long-term care ownership based on
demographics and HD risk. The histogram displays predicted ownership levels for the HD-risk population
and the general population. It is clear from the graph that, in addition to having dierent ownership
levels on average, there is very little overlap in the distributions. The eect of HD risk overwhelms any
observables which determine ownership. Among other things, this may provide comfort that dierences
in the populations { other than HD risk { are not playing an important role in driving the coecients.
Column 3 of Table 3 presents evidence on variations across individuals with dierent risks within the
PHAROS population. The coecient on HD-risk in this column can be interpreted as the additional
ownership, relative to matched controls, among individuals who have not been tested. As before, we see
higher ownership among this group than the controls. Our expectation of adverse selection indicates that
the coecient on \tested positive" should be positive, since these individuals know they will develop HD.
Similarly, the coecient on \tested negative" should be negative: these individuals are just like the
general population in terms of risk.
Column 3 provides some additional evidence of adverse selection. Individuals who know they carry
the genetic mutation are 24 percentage points more likely to own insurance than those who are at risk
but have not been tested; this is signicant. Individuals with a negative test result have a lower
ownership level, but this is not signicant. This second result could be due to \stickiness" in ownership:
once individuals own the insurance, it takes them time to get rid of it.14 An perhaps more likely
14It is also possible that this is an issue with our current data { it is more dicult to infer negative test results than positive
16possibility is that individuals who choose to get tested are, on average, more likely to own insurance
(they are more cautious people, more prepared, etc). If this is correct, then the better test for adverse
selection is whether individuals who test and nd out they carry the genetic mutation have signicantly
higher ownership than those who test and do not carry the genetic mutation; the p-value for this test is
shown at the bottom of Column 3 and we nd the dierence is signicant, with a p-value of 0.06.
As a further test of adverse selection within the HD population, Column 4 of Table 3 explores the
dynamics of purchases around the period of testing by estimating Equation (5) from Section 3. The
evidence in Column 4 also points strongly to adverse selection. The coecients on future testing are
positive { suggesting, perhaps, some small increase in purchases prior to testing { but not signicant. In
contrast, in the periods after testing, individuals who nd out they carry the genetic mutation are 47
percentage points more likely to own insurance, whereas those who test negative own slightly less
insurance than at risk individuals, although this is not signicant. In this case we more strongly reject
equality in after-testing ownership for those who test positive and negative. Similar to Column 3, this
provides evidence of adverse selection even within the HD-risk population.15
Overall, based on Tables 2 and 3, we see about one-quarter of individuals who are at 50% risk for
HD own long-term care insurance, and between 50% and 75% of those who know they carry the genetic
mutation. This is in comparison to ownership rates of roughly 10% on average in the HRS and, as can be
seen in Appendix C, even lower rates in the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Although this clearly points
to signicant adverse selection, there is a lingering question of why these results are not even larger.
Based on the discussion in Section 2, it seems likely that nearly all individuals who carry the HD genetic
mutation will need some long-term care, and they should know this. Why is long-term care insurance
ownership not universal in this population?
One possibility is Medicaid crowd-out: the PHAROS sample is relatively poor, and may believe they
are likely to have their long-term care covered by Medicaid, and therefore do not need insurance.
Another possibility is that individuals believe they would not be able to get insurance, due to their
genetic risk. Although our analysis of insurance contracts suggests this is probably not correct, concerns
about genetic discrimination are high in this population. Unfortunately, we do not have sucient
information in these data to fully tease out these explanations, or others which might be operating.
ones. It is our hope that this will be remedied at some point, when genetic testing data are available.
15The magnitude of the coecient on testing positive is larger than in Column 3, since in Column 3 individuals who rst
test positive in the current period are also included, while in Column 4 the \tested, positive" coecient is identied o of the
period after testing. The larger magnitude suggests that insurance purchases may increase over time, after testing.
17Selection Bias
The analysis of variation among tested individuals in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 brings up a potentially
important issue: are tested individuals comparable to untested individuals? This may be important for
two reasons. First, as in Columns 3 and 4 above, we would like to make statements about dierences in
ownership between untested individuals (approximately 50% risk) and tested individuals who know they
carry the genetic mutation (100% risk). However, to the extent that tested individuals are dierent in
their insurance ownership for reasons other than testing, this will not be a reasonable comparison. It will
still be reasonable to compare those who test and nd out they are carriers (100% risk) to those who test
and nd out they are not (0% risk), but not to make the further comparison with the untested
individuals.
The second issue relates to the use of the PHAROS sample overall as representative of at HD-risk
individuals. To be enrolled in PHAROS, individuals must not have been tested at the time of enrollment.
This means that they will be a selected sample of individuals { the sample is likely to contain individuals
with relatively less inclination to be tested, since those who test when they are young will not be able to
enroll. To the extent that inclination for testing is correlated with insurance purchases, this will mean
this sample does not necessarily give us an accurate picture of the overall population.
The rst thing to note { related largely to the second concern { is that predictive testing for HD is
quite rare. Only about 5% of individuals who are at risk choose to get tested (Walker, 2007). This means
that, in terms of magnitudes, there is a limit to how much this can inuence our results. Even if
individuals who choose to get tested are very dierent { they all own insurance, or none of them do { the
selection of the PHAROS sample will make little dierence in our estimate of the magnitude of adverse
selection.
In addition, we can observe directly whether individuals in our sample who choose to undertake
predictive testing look, prior to testing, very dierent than those who do not.16 Table 4 shows a
regression of long-term care insurance ownership among untested individuals on an indicator for HD risk,
and then HD risk interacted with whether the individual chooses to be tested in the future. To the extent
that this coecient is signicantly dierent from zero, that would point to dierences across individuals
even prior to testing. The results from this regression suggest zero, or at least very limited, selection.
The coecient on the interaction between HD and future testing is an insignicant 0.03. This should
16This regression excludes tested individuals after they have been tested, and also excludes data for tested individuals from
the period immediately prior to testing. This is done because of the concern { consistent in terms of direction with Column
4 of Table 3 that individuals may increase their insurance ownership right before testing as a precaution.
18provide condence both in the value of this sample for representing the overall HD population, and in the
comparability of untested and tested individuals.
5 Calibrating the Future of the long-term Care Insurance Market
The results in the above sections are interesting on their own as a test of whether individuals use available
private information in making choices about insurance. We nd strong evidence of rational behavior and
see individuals making signicantly dierent choices based on the degree of private information they
have. In this section we use our estimates of adverse selection to provide some preliminary predictions
about the viability of the long-term care insurance market as the share of individuals with private genetic
information increases. Further, we will be able to make some preliminary statements about the possible
welfare gains and losses from prohibiting or allowing the use of genetic information in insurance screening.
We consider the potential prot for long-term care insurers as the share of individuals with private
information { the share which has a genetic test like the one available for HD { increases. Among other
things, these calculations can give us an estimate of welfare gain or loss from restricting or allowing rms
to require genetic testing. The key contribution of our results from Section 4 to this calculation is
mapping out the relationship between insurance pricing and purchase behavior among individuals with
dierent amounts of private information.
It is important to note that the results in this section are inevitably much more speculative than
those in previous sections. In order to generate these estimates we make a number of assumptions about
the structure of the market, the use of long-term care insurance by individuals with and without HD, and
about aspects of the demand curve. Perhaps most importantly, we assume in this section that the
insurance purchase behavior among individuals at risk for HD is reective of how individuals with genetic
risks for other diseases with similar mortality or morbidity consequences (like Parkinson disease or
Alzheimer disease) will behave. The unique genetic and clinical features of HD may limit its
generalizability; nevertheless, we feel that these results are likely to be informative about behavior of
individuals with more common diseases.17
17Taylor et al (2009) give a discussion of similar issues, focusing on the case of Alzheimer disease, although they do not
provide a calibration of this type.
195.1 Setup
We consider a monopoly provider of long-term care insurance facing a market of individuals, some of
whom have private information.18 This insurer can oer an insurance product for some premium which
pays o if the individual needs long-term care.
For simplicity, we focus on a case with two types of individuals: high types, who constitute a share 
of the population and have a very high probability of needing long-term care, and low types (share 1   )
who have a lower probability of needing care. We consider whether there is a pooling equilibrium which
provides positive prots.19 Since we know that individuals in the general population will purchase
actuarially unfair insurance in some cases, it is plausible that for a small enough , their premiums will
cover the high type. How large  can be and still sustain this pooling equilibrium is the primary question
of interest here. The crucial input to this calculation is the demand for insurance by each type: how
much higher is the demand by the high (expensive) type than the low type? This will be informed by the
results in Section 4.
Based on the details of the insurance product (benet levels, coverage length, etc), insurance
premiums and the probability of needing various types of long-term care, we dene expected pay in and
pay out for each type. Denote the present discounted value of money paid in premiums for type i as i
and presented discounted value of money paid out in benets for type i as i. We dene insurance load as
the amount paid out for each dollar paid in: loadi = i i
i . We note that we expect H to be larger than
L, since we have dened the high type as having a larger chance of needing long-term care. It is also
possible that the pay in (i) is lower for the high type, since they pay premiums for a shorter time,
although this need not be true. The higher value of H indicates that, for any given insurance product
and premium, load will be higher for the high type.
Demand for insurance is a function of insurance load, and we can use the results from Section 4,
along with load calculations, to estimate this relationship. Using data from actual insurance contracts and
information on transitions between states, we calculate the long-term care insurance load for individuals
in the general population, those with a roughly 50% risk for HD and those with 100% risk of HD. We use
code based on Brown and Finkelstein (2007) to calculate loads for the general population; for the HD-risk
18As we discuss below, for our purposes we could draw similar conclusions using a competitive market with an imposition
of zero prots.
19We believe there will not be a separating equilibrium in this case. The high types here expect to need long-term care
with a probability very close to one. Given this, long-term care \insurance" for them is not really insurance, but rather a
valuable nancial asset. The insurer will only be willing to insure these high types at a very high price { close to the full price
of long-term care { and will need to oer a much lower price-lower coverage plan to the low types. But this latter plan will
need to be a more attractive nancial asset to entice the low types, and the high types will therefore prefer that, violating the
incentive compatibility constraint.
20population we use a number of sources (Bolt, 1970; Nance and Saunders, 1996; Walker et al, 1981;
Harper, 1996; our PHAROS data) to estimate the need for long-term care among HD-risk individuals.
The results in Section 4 tell us the demand (share of individuals purchasing) which correspond to each
load value. This gives us three observations which we can use to map demand onto load.20
A nal important element in this relationship is the load at which demand is equal to zero. We
could, in principle, pin this value down using the three points we observe. However, to the extent that
there are non-linearities in this relationship (which there appear to be even based on the three primary
data points), this may not be accurate. As an alternative, we pick this value { which we call the
\zero-purchase load" { to match the premiums and demand that we observe in the market. That is, we
identify a value for the zero-purchase load which implies, at least roughly, optimal prices and quantities
that match the prices and quantities we observe. This value is -0.4: no one will want to purchase
insurance if the payout is less than $0.60 per $1 paid in. We will explore the robustness of our results to
this assumption. Using this nal data point, along with the three primary data points, we estimate a
non-parametric demand-load relationship.
This relationship between load and demand is not directly interpretable as a demand curve, since
load is not equal to price. However, any price p chosen by the insurer will translate into a load for the
high type and a load for the low type and, hence, into quantity demanded. The key is that since the
values of i, and possibly i, dier across types, the load dened by a single price p will be dierent for
the two types and they will have dierent demands for the same price. We therefore dene a demand
curve for each type { DH(p) and DL(p).
Given this setup, the insurer revenue and cost functions are straightforward. Revenue (R) is the pay
in for each type (i), multiplied by the demand from each type (Di(p)) and the share of that type ( or
1   ). Cost (C) is the sum of the payouts to each type (the is) multiplied by the share of that type
consuming the insurance. These are expressed formally in Equations (6) and (7) below.
R = DH(p)H + (1   )DL(p)L (6)
C = DH(p)H + (1   )DL(p)L (7)
The monopoly insurer will choose a price p to maximize R   C; this price will vary with .21 Note that
20To do these calcuations for indiviauls at risk for HD we use the basic framework provided by Brown and Finkelstein (2007)
and used in their paper. We use the same assumptions that they use on interest rate progression, cost of nursing and payouts
by insurers. The only change we make is in the transition matrices. For individuals at risk for HD we assume (a) more likely
transition into needing home care and nursing care, (b) faster death once in those states, (c) no possibility of assisted living
(this is quite unusual for individuals with HD, who are typically either at home or in a nursing home) and (d) no transition out
of those state. We use information from the listed sources to generate transition matrices; the matrices we use are available
from the authors.
21We could also model the insurance market as competitive, and assume a zero prot condition. In this case we would
21the insurer always has the option to sell only to the high type. We evaluate prots under dierent values
of , and report the largest  at which the insurer will continue to sell to both types.
5.2 Results: Demand Curves and Optimal Prices
Throughout this section we focus on a world in which the insurer oers only one insurance plan: the
primary insurance plan analyzed by Brown and Finkelstein (2007). This is a policy that pays a maximum
benet of $100 per day, covers home care, assisted living care and nursing care, and lasts for a duration
of, at most, 4 years. Based on this plan, and our data on the need for long-term care, we calculate loads
and quantity demanded for the two types of individuals under dierent premiums.
Figure 3 shows the estimated demand curves for long-term care insurance for the two types of
individuals. Consistent with our adverse selection results, we nd that at any price the demand is larger
for high type than low type individuals. At premiums above $1700, no low risk individuals will purchase
insurance (actual premiums for this policy, in the data, are around $1190), and the market contains only
high-risk individuals. Demand for insurance among high risk individuals is positive for any annual
premium under $6500. For prices between $1700 and $6500, the market contains only high risk
individuals. For both groups, demand is more elastic at lower prices.
To give some sense of how these demand curves vary under varying assumptions about the
zero-purchase load, Appendix Figure 1 shows demand for the high type as this varies (the relative
positions of the low type demand curves are similar). The exact shape of the curves varies with the
zero-purchase assumption. In addition, not surprisingly, the lower we assume this zero-purchase load is,
the higher is the maximum price under which individuals will purchase insurance.
Based on these demand curves we calculate optimal pricing and demand by the two types over a
range of values of . These results are reported in Panel A of Table 5. For a zero value of , optimal
premium is around $1350, close to the actual price for this insurance product. At this point, both high
and low types are purchasing insurance { about 7% of the low types, and 35% of the high types, similar
to what we see in the data. As  increases, there are some relatively small increases in pricing over some
range before the market abruptly changes when the share of the high type reaches above 2.5%. The full
dynamics of this can be seen in Appendix Figure 2. Above 2.5% of the high type, the insurer can no
longer make non-zero prots by selling to both high and low types. They will still be willing { at a much
higher price { to sell insurance to the high types. It's dicult to predict whether or not the insurer would
ask whether there is any price p, under H, which would produce non-negative prots. This analysis leads us to the same
conclusions about the highest possible , since the question is still { in essence { whether there is any surplus available, and
the only dierence in the market structure is who gets the rents.
22continue to operate at this point, with such a small share of the market as possible consumers.
Panel B of Table 5 shows similar calculations for the assumption of -0.6 as the zero-purchase load.
The key thing to notice here is that while the exact value of  at which the market shifts to only selling
to the high type is larger here { 5% rather than 2.5% { the basic pattern is exactly the same. Indeed,
with demand curves that have this basic structure, we would expect the general intuition here to be
robust. There will be a point at which the insurer cannot protably sell to both types, and the market
changes structure. As a side note, the fact that with this assumption the premium at  = 0 is much
higher, and purchases are lower, than what we see in the data suggests that this assumption is less
consistent with our data.
5.3 Results: Welfare Under Varying Information Schemes
This analysis also allows us to ask how the level, and distribution, of consumer surplus would change if
we allowed insurers to observe individual type { that is, if the type was not private information. This is a
policy relevant question: although our survey of current insurance plans suggest they do not require
genetic testing, insurers could in principle introduce this requirement. The fear of this has led a number
of states to pass laws forbidding the use of genetic test results in insurance pricing, which will prohibit
insurers from observing this private genetic information.
Based on the demand curves in Figure 3, and the optimal pricing in Column 2 of Table 5, we are
able calculate consumer surplus in the pooling equilibrium for various values of .22 The consumer
surplus under full revelation is also simple. In this case, the price charged to the low types will be equal
to the price when  = 0, and the price charged to high types will be equal to what they are charged when
they are the only ones in the market.
Figure 4 illustrates the variation in total consumer surplus under the two information schemes as 
varies. For small values of  { below the level at which the market switches to selling only to the high
type { the consumer surplus is higher under the private information scheme. In addition, this surplus
increases as  gets larger. This is due to the fact that, at the optimal prices, the high type individuals get
a much, much larger surplus than the low types. As the share of this type increases, the total surplus
increases.
This situation is reversed once  increases over the critical value of (in this case) about 2.5%, and
the market sells only to the high type when information is private. In this case, the surplus under private
information goes only to the high type. The total consumer surplus is strictly larger under full
22As is standard, consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve above the price charged.
23information revelation, because at that point the insurer could continue to sell to both types, both of
whom would receive positive surplus. Importantly, our results suggest that once  is above this critical
value, it would be Pareto-improving to reveal the private information. The high types would be no worse
o, since they are already being charged the full price they would pay under private information, and the
low types would be made better o since they would be able to purchase insurance.
This is a strong result. It suggests that above this critical, market-changing value, there are no
distributional or equality-based tradeos for public versus private information.23 Public information is at
least weakly better for everyone. It is also worth nothing that although the specic critical value is
obviously sensitive to the demand curves and the assumptions that go into generating them, the idea that
there will be a critical value above which public information is better should not be sensitive to that. For
example, in the case where we assume the zero-purchase load is -0.6, the critical value is 5%, but the
intuition is identical.
This analysis also makes it clear that in the short term, while the share of high type individuals is
below the critical value, whether genetic information is public or private has distributional consequences.
Put simply, keeping information private transfers utility from low type to high type individuals. The low
types pay higher premiums because of their pooling with the high types, and the high types pay lower
premiums because of their pooling with the low types. Similarly, allowing insurers to observe this
information transfers utility in the other direction.
Together, this suggests that in the case of long-term care insurance, once the share of individuals
with private information gets suciently high, laws that keep genetic information private are not
optimal. In the short run, such laws may or may not be optimal, depending on how distributional
concerns trade o against overall consumer surplus. In a world where the total consumer surplus was the
only relevant value, these laws are optimal in the short run. This is, of course, complicated for policy
since statues are rarely written to run out when information gets suciently advanced, but it is
nevertheless the implication of this model.
Existing Genetic Information An important follow-up issue is how much genetic knowledge we
currently possess. The evidence above suggest that at relatively small values for , the insurance market
may undergo signicant changes. However, the fact that this value of  is small relative to 1 is not the
important question. More important is understanding whether it is likely that the actual genetic
knowledge will reach this level in the near future. It is important to note rst that HD alone is not nearly
23By \public" here we indicate that the information is avaialble to the insurer; for obvious reasons making the information
available to the public at large might well have negative consequences.
24common enough to have signicant eects on this market { the share of individuals in the population
who carry the HD genetic mutation is only 0.01% { and unlikely to vary much around that. HD alone
will not aect the long-term care insurance market.
However, genetic information is increasingly available for other, more common conditions. To get a
sense of the magnitude of current information, we focus on genetic knowledge about the diseases that the
long-term care insurers are particularly concerned about { namely, those on which insurers screen. We
base this on information from long-term care insurance applications. At the start of the application,
insurers ask whether the application has any of a set of roughly 10 diseases. If they say yes, they are
advised not to continue with the application. Four of these diseases { Huntington, Parkinson, Alzheimer
and ALS (Lou Gehrig's Disease) { have at least some genetic basis and the potential for private
information. Appendix Table 1 lists, for each of these diseases, the available genetic information, as well
as the overall prevalence in the population. In three of the four cases { everything except Parkinson
disease { at least some aected individuals could have perfect genetic information prior to symptoms. In
the case of Parkinson disease the predictiveness of the genetic testing is positive, but somewhat smaller.
Overall, these data suggest that { at the moment, based on just these diseases { roughly 0.1% of the
population could be (with genetic testing) \high types" in the context of the model above. This number
is extremely small. Given this, it is not surprising that insurers do not screen extensively on genetics.
With even a small cost of genetic testing it would not be sensible to screen given the population shares.
Further, it seems clear there are some costs of pricing dierently to dierent groups, since long-term care
insurers typically do not price dierently based on simple characteristics like sex (Brown and Finkelstein,
2007). On the other hand, the overall shares in the population suggest that signicant advances in
identifying genes predicting Parkinson and Alzheimer diseases alone could be sucient to bring the share
of high types close to the critical value.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use data on individuals at risk for a high-morbidity disease to estimate adverse selection
in long-term care insurance purchases. We nd strong evidence of adverse selection. Individuals with a
50% risk of carrying the HD genetic mutation are about two and a half times as likely to own long-term
care insurance, relative to matched controls, and those who know they carry the genetic mutation (100%
risk) are about ve times as likely as matched controls.
Using our estimates of adverse selection in long-term care, embedded in a simple model of the
25insurance market, we argue that the viability of private long-term care insurance, at least in its current
form, may be threatened by increases in the share of individuals with private genetic information. As
these individuals become a larger share of the population, insurers will be unable to make positive prots
by oering a single price to all individuals. Barring an ability to observe individual types, private
insurance companies may shut down, or sell only to high type individuals. To the extent that this is likely
to occur, it may be Pareto-improving to allow insurers to observe genetic information in the state of the
world where the share of individuals with private information is suciently large. However, a simple
calibration suggests that, at the current state of genetic knowledge, total consumer surplus is higher under
private information; this suggests that, at least for the immediate future, it may be optimal from a total
consumer surplus standpoint to retain systems which keep this information private. This conclusions may
be important in driving optimal policy, especially as legislation increasingly limits the ability of insurers
to observe or use genetic information in pricing (i.e. United States House of Representatives, 2007).
An interesting and important follow-up question is to what extent are these results likely to apply to
other insurance markets. Although it is obviously dicult to draw strong conclusions about this, it seems
likely that the basic point that people respond to changes in insurance prices generated by genetic
information is portable across contexts. However, other insurance markets may have dierent
institutional or other features which limit (or exacerbate) the adverse selection generated by information.
For example, health insurance owned through an employer may be less subject to this type of selection,
simply due to more limited individual-specic variation in policies. Exploring the impact of this type of
information on other markets seems a fruitful avenue for future work.
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Share of Population Purchasing Insurance, by Type
Figure 3:





Notes: This figure shows the demand for long term care insurance by a high type (with HD gene) and a low type (no HD gene). Details on how this 
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Notes: This figure shows consumer surplus under private information versus public (i.e. observable to the insurer) information.  
31Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Individuals at risk for HD (PHAROS Data)
Mean Standard Deviation Number of Obs.
Female 0.688 0.463 826
Married 0.708 0.455 685
Children 1.76 1.62 644
Education (yrs) 15.03 2.06 784
Employed 0.867 0.339 657
Age 40.8 7.67 826
Panel B: General Population (HRS Data, Under 66)
Mean Standard Deviation Number of Obs.
Female 0.582 0.493 7614
Married 0.768 0.422 7614
Children 3.24 2.02 7614
Education (yrs) 12.89 3.13 7614
Employed 0.828 0.377 6172
Age 58.12 5.25 7614
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the two samples used in the data. The Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS) is from 2000; the PHAROS data is collected over the period from
1999-present. In the analysis, we use multiple observations per individual from the PHAROS data,
but the summary statistics here include only one observation per individual.
Table 2. Insurance Ownership Comparison of Means
Group Share Owning Insurance Sample Size
HRS, simple mean 9.9% 5980
HRS, weighted by PHAROS age prole 8.2% 5980
PHAROS, untested 24.8% 2436
PHAROS, tested, Carry HD mutation 49.2% 71
PHAROS, tested, do not carry HD mutation 18.8% 32
p-value HRS vs. PHAROS untested p<.0001
p-value PHAROS untested vs. carry mutation p<.0001
p-value PHAROS untested vs. do not carry mutation p=.42
p-value tested carry gene vs. tested do not carry mutation p=.003
Notes: This table shows simple means of ownership levels by risk status for long-term care in-
surance, and t-tests of dierences between groups. In the last row we report means for the HRS
weighted by the age distribution in PHAROS. The PHAROS data are restricted to asymptomatic
individuals to avoid the concern that symptomatic individuals may have already used their long-
term care insurance.
32Table 3. Adverse Selection in Long-term Care Insurance
Dependent Variable: Own long-term Care Insurance


















Tested in Two Periods  :0201
(:108)
Tested Next Period :1689
(:148)
Tested This Period :1338
(:143)
Tested Before This Period, Positive :4706
(:18)
Tested Before This Period, Negaive  :0354
(:188)
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
AGE FIXED EFFECTS NO YES YES YES
p-value, pos vs. neg .06 .05
Number of Observations 7315 7315 7292 7167
R2 .05 .06 .06 .06
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table compares long-term care insurance ownership for individuals at risk for Huntington
disease and those in the general population (from the HRS). Controls (in all columns) are: income
categories, education categories, number of children, married, gender and employment status. All columns
limit the sample to asymptomatic individuals, who are dened as individuals in the HRS or any individuals
in PHAROS who are not showing obvious signs of HD. \Testing, Unclear" indicates that the test result
could not be inferred from the data, not that the test was unclear to the individual (see Appendix A).
33Table 4. Sample Selection: Insurance Ownership Among Ever Tested Versus Not
Dependent Variable: Own long-term Care Ins.
Explanatory
Variables:
At Risk for HD :1301
(:024)
HD, Ever Tested :0315
(:08)
Controls in all columns: income categories, education categories, number of children, married,
gender, employed, age xed eects.
Number of Observations 7207
R2 .06
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table estimates the dierence in adverse selection among individuals who were tested
at all during the sample versus those who were never tested. The sample is limited to people who
have not yet been tested. The \Ever Tested" variable is therefore equal to one if the individual
will be tested in the future.
34Table 5. Optimal Pricing, Variations in High Type
Panel A: Primary Results, Zero-Purchase Load = -0.4
Share of Optimal Share of High Share of Low
High Type Premium Type Purchasing Type Purchasing
0.0% 1350 35.2% 6.7%
0.5% 1360 34.5% 6.5%
1.0% 1385 33.3% 6.0%
1.5% 1405 32.3% 5.5%
2.0% 1405 32.3% 5.5%
2.5% 1435 31.3% 4.9%
3.0% 5120 6.7% 0.0%
5.0% 5120 6.7% 0.0%
7.0% 5120 6.7% 0.0%
10.0% 5120 6.7% 0.0%
15.0% 5120 6.7% 0.0%
Panel B: Robustness, Zero-Purchase Load = -0.6
Share of Optimal Share of High Share of Low
High Type Premium Type Purchasing Type Purchasing
0.0% 1665 30.5% 5.1%
0.5% 1695 29.8% 4.9%
1.0% 1695 29.8% 4.9%
1.5% 1750 28.9% 4.5%
2.0% 1775 28.5% 4.3%
2.5% 1790 28.1% 4.1%
3.0% 1830 27.6% 3.9%
5.0% 6305 5.1% 0.0%
7.0% 6305 5.1% 0.0%
10.0% 6305 5.1% 0.0%
15.0% 6305 5.1% 0.0%
Notes: This table shows variation in optimal pricing and share of individuals purchasing as we vary the share
of the high type in the population. Results are generated based on the model in Section 6. Panel A shows our
primary results; Panel B shows the robustness of these results to variation in our assumption about the load at
which purchases are equal to zero.
35Appendix A: Inferring Insurance Ownership
This appendix discusses how we infer insurance ownership among individuals in the PHAROS data. There are two
PHAROS surveys which cover insurance. The rst, the \Life Decision Survey", was administered (typically) once
or twice to each individual during the study. In this survey individuals were asked, for each type of insurance,
whether they currently had insurance. Based on this question alone { whether the individual has insurance { it
would be possible to run our analysis. However, in this case we would have only one or two observations per
individual (i.e. only one or two years). Having multiple observations over time is helpful in identifying variation
within the HD sample and, for example, exploring decision making in the period around testing.
We use two pieces of data to identify changes over time. First, in the Life Decision Survey individuals were
also asked how many years they had held insurance for. Second, a separate survey, called the \Insurance and
Employment Survey", was administered at a larger number of visits. In this survey individuals were asked (among
other things) if they had made any changes to their insurance in the last year. Using these two pieces of information
together, we inferred ownership for years that were not covered by the primary Life Decision Survey question.
The procedure was as follows. For all internally consistent points (i.e. none of the observations for a given
individual gave information that could not logically be true given some other observation for that individual):
1. If there was data indicating the number of years the individual had insurance, the former years were lled in
as having insurance, and the year prior to having the insurance (if it was in the observation period) was
marked as not having insurance.
2. If no data on the number of years the individual had insurance was available in any observation, or if values
remained unknown, then all points where the state of insurance (having or not having) and the presence of
change (i.e. is this state dierent than last year or next year) were known had the state imputed backwards
or forwards a period, respectively.
For all points that were inconsistent, meaning that at least one of the observations gave information that was
logically inconsistent with other data provided:
1. For two or three inconsistent observations (there were never more than that) if one of them was corroborated
by more other data points, then that information was extrapolated in the manner described above.
2. For two or three inconsistent observations, if none of them could be corroborated by other data points, then
precedence was given to the earliest observation, its information was extrapolated, and all other points were
lled in.
We note that number of inconsistent observations was fairly small, and the results we report are robust to
excluding these.
Appendix B: Inferring Genetic Test Results
This appendix discusses how we infer genetic test results for individuals who report testing in the data. Although
genetic tests were performed as part of the study, we do not have access to those data at this point, and must infer
test results from other information in our data. An observation in the data is an individual-visit, and visits occur
approximately every 9 months to 1 year. At each visit, individuals are asked if they have had genetic testing. At
enrollment, no one was tested; over the course of the study, about 10% of individuals eventually get tested. We are
concerned only with inferring test results for tested individuals.
There are two pieces of information we use for this inference. The rst is the doctor reports on the likelihood
they think the individual has HD, which are on a scale from 0 to 4, where 3 indicates \symptoms of HD with
greater than 90% condence" and 4 indicates \symptoms with greater than 99% condence". The second is
self-reported probability of having HD, which is asked at a subset of visits. We observe these variables at visits
after testing takes place. We code an individual as having tested positive if at these subsequent visits either (a) a
doctor reports they have a 3 or 4 on the rating scale or (b) the individual reports a 100% probability of carrying
the genetic mutation. We code an individual as testing negative if they report a 0% probability of carrying the
genetic mutation. Some individuals cannot be coded, since they do not t either of these proles, typically because
they are not asked about their probability of carrying the genetic mutation after testing.
36It should be clear from this discussion that our data on positive test results is likely to be more comprehensive
than the data on negative test results; it seems likely that a majority of the individuals for whom we cannot infer
test results actually tested negative.
Appendix C: Alternative Data Sources for non-HD Population
Our primary data source for not-at-risk individuals is the Health and Retirement Survey. As we note above, in
many ways these data are well suited as a comparison: the structure of the information on long-term care insurance
is similar to what we have in the PHAROS data and similar controls are available. The main downside of these
data is the mismatch in terms of age. Given the HRS sample frame, the sample is on average much older than the
PHAROS sample. As we note, there is actually full overlap in ages available, since the HRS does sample some
younger individuals, but there is relatively little data available on younger individuals. On average, we expect this
to bias our results downward, especially since long-term care insurance ownership is much more common among
older people.
In this appendix we use another dataset{ the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) { to estimate our main
results. This has the advantage of covering a larger age range, and the overall age prole is similar to the PHAROS
data. The main downside is that the data on insurance ownership is much less comparable (this is described in
further detail below), and we have signicant concerns about under-reporting of insurance coverage (Meyer and
Sullivan, 2007). Nevertheless, we will see from the analyses below that the results are quite similar with these
datasets and, as we expect, if anything our results understate the extent of adverse selection.
There are two questions in the CEX which can be used to infer long-term care insurance ownership. First,
households are asked to report their expenditures on long-term care insurance. Second, they are later asked to
report the total number of policies that they pay for. From these two sources, we construct a measure of the
number of long-term care policies held by the household. There are at least two issues with these data. First, we
observe counts of the number of policies held by the household overall, not measures of individual ownership. In
some cases, allocation is easy { if there are two policies in a household with two people, it seems most likely that
one is held by each. In other cases, allocation is dicult { if there is only one policy in a two person household, or
two policies in a three adult, multi-generational household. Second, the CEX is known to have issues with
under-reporting; in recent years comparison to the national accounts suggests only about 55% of expenditures are
reported (Meyer and Sullivan, 2007). This could lead us to overstate adverse selection.
To address the rst of these issues, we simply allocate fractions of policies if necessary. That is, we take the
number of policies owned by the household, divide it by the number of adults in the household, and assume each
adult owns that fraction of a policy. If there are two adults and two policies, each has one. If there are two adults
and one policy, each have one half. This is equivalent to assigning polices randomly if there are more individuals
than policies. In cases where there are more policies than individuals (this is very unusual) we code only one policy
per individual, to match how this is reported in the PHAROS data. We address the second issue only after
observing the results. In particular, after we observe the actual adverse selection in the data, we can ask how large
it would be if ownership in the CEX was twice as large.
The table below shows estimates of adverse selection in long-term care insurance, using the CEX rather than
the HRS as a comparison. This is comparable to Table 3 in the paper; we leave out the latter two columns, since
the coecients on testing positive and negative are identied o of variations within the PHAROS population and
are therefore unchanged by the change in comparison set.










AGE FIXED EFFECTS NO YES
Number of Observations 11395 11395
R2 .13 .13
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table compares long-term care insurance ownership for individuals
at risk for Huntington disease and those in the general population (from the
CEX). Controls (in all columns) are: income categories, education categories,
number of children, married, gender and employment status. All columns limit
the sample to asymptomatic individuals, who are dened as individuals in the
CEX or any individuals in PHAROS who are not showing obvious signs of HD.
Relative to the primary results, in Table 3, the comparison with the CEX suggests slightly higher adverse
selection (18% versus 13%). However, a simple adjustment for under-reporting brings the results almost completely
into line. The average rate of long-term care ownership in the CEX is 3.8%. Assume only 50% of expenditures are
reported and that this translates to 50% of individuals who own long-term care not reporting having a policy.
Ownership is therefore around 7.6%, the coecient would be 14.1%, very close to what we see in Table 3.
Regardless of whether we adjust the coecients or not, however, the message is similar. If anything, our
estimates using the HRS understate the degree of adverse selection in long-term care insurance, although not by
very much.































Share of Population Purchasing Insurance, High Types Only
Appendix Figure 1
Demand Curves, High Type, Robustness to Alternative Assumptions
Zero Purchase Load = -0.3
Zero Purchase Load = -0.4
Zero Purchase Load = -0.6
Notes: This figure shows the demand for long term care insurance by a high type -- an individual who knows they carry the HD gene -- under 



























































































Alpha (Share of Population High Risk)
Appendix Figure 2:






Notes: This figure shows variation in optimal insurance pricing and demand by the two types as the high type share of the population varies.  
39Appendix Table 1. Currently Available Genetic Testing
Disease Prevalence Current Genetic Testing In-
formation
Sources
Huntington disease 0.01% Perfectly predictive test covers
100% of cases
(Walker, 2007)
Parkinson disease 1.7% Genetic tests can detect
causative mutations in less
than 5% of cases, but are not
commercially available.
Elbaz et al, 2002;
Pankratz et al., 2009
Alzheimer disease Early Onset: 0.8%;
All cases (early and
late onset): 11%
Genetic test perfectly predicts
early onset for 5% of cases with
100% accuracy, but is not com-
mercially available; a dierent
and widely available genetic test
can predict increased risk (2-3
times higher) of late onset
Beiser et al., 2008;
Reiman et al., 2007; Na-
tional Institute on Aging,
2008; Tang et al., 1998
ALS 0.02% Perfectly predictive test covers
20-25% of inherited cases, which
make up 10% of all cases (avail-
able); tests theoretically possible
for a fraction of other inherited
cases, but not performed. No
test for the non-inherited 90% of
cases.
Johnston et al., 2006;
Pasinelli and Brown, 2006.
Notes: This table describes currently available genetic knowledge about diseases which are of primary concern
to long-term care insurers. The source column lists only a subset of sources on each topic, typically a summary
article.
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